the treasury.  We must insist, at this point, that our opponents have failed in their assault upon our main contention: 

First, that the evils in American city government are not attributable to the fundamental principles of that government; second, that the principles underlying the proposed form are in themselves wrong and are not consonant generally with American ideals.  It remains to be shown that the commission form is impracticable as a general scheme for the government of all American cities.

We can very well agree that where the commission form of government has been tried it has been productive of some good results, and further, that in certain homogeneous communities of high culture and intelligence it might work with considerable success; but that the result obtained in cities where the commission form has been tried would warrant the universal adoption of it by American cities we must deny.

We deny the wisdom of adopting the commission form for it results in inadequate responsibility; third, it could never work in the vast majority of American cities.  These reasons are apparent from examinations of the commission form where it has been and is being tried, and are inherent in the plan itself.

The tremendous centralization of power under this form of city government cannot escape a critical observer.  A small body of men have absolute sway over the destiny of the city.  They make all laws from the minutely specified contract for a water system to all important school legislation.  All franchises are engineered by them.  All contracts, great and small, are let by them.  The city’s bonded debt is in their hands; by them the city is taxed and incumbered.  Parks, police, streets, education, public buildings, engineering, finance—­everything from the smallest administrative duty to the all-engrossing functions of legislation devolves upon this commission.  They can vacate any office, can create any office, and without limit fix any salary they choose.  The entire officialdom, outside of the commission itself, and all the employes and the servants of the city are by law made the agents, servants, and dependents of the council.  The possibilities for machine power with this autocratic centralization of authority are without condition.  We can demonstrate this best by giving practical illustrations taken from the active operation of the commission form.  We may preface these by saying that there is nothing inherent in the commission form or any of its attributes which can insure the selection of better men for office.  The members of the commission will be about the same kind of men as the ordinary city official.  Minneapolis by an election at large placed in the mayor’s chair its most notorious grafter.  This is proved by the personnel of the commissions where the system is being tried.  The investigating committee appointed by the city of Des Moines, quoting their exact words, say