But this condition is disastrous to successful administration.  Whenever the people desire even the slightest change in their local policy, the stability and continuity of the city departments must be upset.  Representation is secured at the expense of efficiency.  Administration becomes saturated with politics.

Again, Honorable Judges, the management of a city should be subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body.  Both the welfare of the people and the interests of good administration demand it.  Administrators, no matter how valuable their technical knowledge, make poor legislators.  Being interested in their work, they very naturally exalt and magnify their departments.  Just a few years ago, the city of Cleveland found it necessary to take even the preparation of the budget from the heads of the departments concerned and to place it with a board which could view with impartiality the demands of the various department chiefs.  Think of turning over all the functions of a city like St. Louis to an executive cabinet without even the oversight or criticism of an impartial body.

And, Honorable Judges, the whole experience of government proves the absolute necessity for a separate legislative department.  Look where you will, and in each case there is an executive cabinet, based upon appointment, untrammelled by the burdens of legislation, and subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body.  In Europe, the city councils are elected by the people, and the administrative departments are made up through a process of selection and appointment, together with the assurance of reasonable permanence of tenure, responsibility, and adequate support.  Likewise in America, the larger cities are already organizing their cabinets upon a somewhat similar basis.  The six largest cities of New York, all of the cities of Indiana, Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, and many others are securing their important administrative officials through appointment by the mayor.  This is the general plan advocated by the National Municipal League.  It centers responsibility for the administration in one man.  On the other hand, some of the cities of Canada follow more closely to the German system.  There the cabinet is selected by a representative council.  In practically all of these instances, men of special ability have been obtained, the departments of administration have been properly correlated, responsibility has been concentrated, and the general principle, that successful administration depends upon a separately constituted legislative body, has been firmly established.

It is plain then that a commission form violates the fundamental principles of successful administration.  It first attempts to secure a cabinet by popular vote.  It then upsets the stability of the city departments by completely uniting both the legislative and the administrative functions.  Finally, it destroys the responsibility of that