The Affirmative continue to direct their attack against the “old form.”  Yet my colleague has suggested substantial changes in present city organization, changes which have brought about success wherever tried.  Moreover, we wish to make it clear that we are not necessarily standing for a division of power.  There may be separately constituted departments of government, one primarily for administration, the other primarily for legislation, yet a concentration of authority in one of them, as in the case under the cabinet system of Europe.  The gentlemen of the opposition are advocating not only a concentration of power, but a fusion of functions as well.  Their commission is at once the executive cabinet and the legislative body.

We have heard much about the practical working of the new plan.  Upon this matter, the Negative shall have a few words to say before the close of the debate.  But granting for the sake of argument that the commission form has operated with some degree of success in a few small towns, especially when compared with the admitted inefficient machinery of government in vogue before its adoption and when favored by an aroused civic interest, nevertheless, it does not follow that it is adapted to the needs of the typical American city.  There, administration is a matter of great complexity and of vital importance.  Boston has pay-rolls including 12,000 and annual expenditure of $40,000,000.  Successful administration under such conditions has necessitated the growth of city departments.  The heads of the various departments constitute an executive cabinet.  Under the commission form, this cabinet is established by popular election and made the single governmental body for the performance of both the legislative and the administrative functions.

    Such a fusion of functions must necessarily result:  in poor
    administration; in the sacrifice of legislation; and in the ultimate
    destruction of local self-government.

    Consider the problem of administration.

An efficient cabinet cannot, as a rule, be secured by popular election.  Men who possess the ability to direct a city department acquire such capacity only after years of preparation, and such men will not endure the uncertainties of a career dependent upon the favor of the public.  The commissioner of finance who understands the intricate problems of accounting will not coddle the people to insure his election.  Popular judgment, no matter how enlightened, cannot be entrusted with the selection of such men.  The old board system proves this conclusively.  Here, the choosing of the heads of the important city departments was placed in the hands of the people.  The system stands condemned.

A commission form makes the additional blunder of uniting completely the two functions of legislation and administration in the same body.  This makes the commissioners representative in character.