and Delaware.
Proper correlation between departments is best facilitated in the cabinet form, because all governing power is vested in the legislative body, which in turn delegates all administrative functions to the cabinet. However, many cities have properly correlated mayor and council by utilizing the model charter of the National Municipal League. The Negative, therefore, is here to promulgate no specific form for all American cities: conditions in Boston may require a different mechanism from that in San Francisco, but whatever form, the underlying principle of a proper division of functions must be embodied. The Affirmative must admit that proper correlation of departments has brought about municipal success, as far as mere organization can do so, yet, notwithstanding that, after fifteen years of misrule under the commission form in Sacramento the freeholders by unanimous choice again adopted distinct legislative and administrative bodies; and that the commission form has lately operated but a few years in a few small cities, amid aroused civic interest. The Affirmative would abolish at one blow the working principle of successful city organization in France, Germany, England, Canada, and unnumbered cities in the United States.
In the second place, evils in our cities are due to bad social and economic conditions. Harrisburg, Pa., was notoriously corrupt. A spirit of reform aroused the citizens, and Harrisburg stands today as a remarkable example of efficient government, yet the form of organization has been unchanged.
In many of our large cities there is a feeble civic spirit, due, in part, to undesirable immigrants, the prey to the boss, and utterly lacking in inherited traditions so essential to the capacity of self-government. Another instance: the mutual taxing system has fostered public extravagance and loss of interest on the part of the taxpayer. Again, favor-seeking corporations have continually employed corrupt methods. James Bryce says that in the development of a stronger sense of civic duty rather than any change in the form of government lies the ultimate hope of municipal reform.
A third cause of municipal ills is that of poor business methods. First, unjust election laws and lack of proper primaries have permitted the corrupt arts of the caucus politician. Second, lack of a uniform system of accounting has served only to conceal the facts, resulting in apathy on the part of the people, diffusion of responsibility, and widespread corruption among officials. Third, lack of publicity of proceedings has protected graft. Fourth, lack of civil service has perpetuated the spoils system.
All these can and are being remedied. The Bureau of Municipal Research shows plainly that it is not necessary to change fundamental principles to secure business efficiency. It reorganized the Real Estate Bureau of New York that eluded