that his only aim was to complete the splendid work of liberation so happily begun; questions of government would be reserved for the conclusion of the war.  Joy was the order of the day, but the fatal mistakes of the campaign had already commenced; there had been inexcusable delay in declaring war; if it was pardonable to wait for the Milanese initiative, it was as inexpedient as it seemed ungenerous to wait till the issue of the struggle at Milan was decided.  Then, after the declaration of war, considering that the Sardinian Government must have seen its imminence for weeks, and indeed for months, there was more time lost than ought to have been the case in getting the troops under weigh.  Still, at the opening of the campaign, two grand possibilities were left.  The first was obviously to cut Radetsky off in his painful retreat, largely performed along country by-roads, as he had to avoid the principal cities which were already free.  Had Charles Albert caught him up while he was far from the Quadrilateral, the decisive blow would have been struck, and the only man who could save Austria in Italy would have been taken prisoner.  Radetsky chose the route of Lodi and the lower Brescian plains to Montechiaro, where the encampments were ready for the Austrian spring manoeuvres:  from this point an easy march carried him under the walls of Verona.  Here he met General d’Aspre, who had just arrived with the garrison of Padua.  D’Aspre, by skill and resolution, had brought his men from Padua without losing one, having refused the Paduans arms for a national guard, though ordered from Milan to grant them.  ‘You come to tell me all is lost,’ said the Field-Marshal when they met ‘No,’ rejoined the younger general, ’I come to tell you all is saved.’

This great chance missed, there was another which could have been seized.  Mantua, extraordinary to relate, was defended by only three hundred artillerymen and a handful of hussars.  It would have fallen into the hands of its own citizens but for the presence of mind of its commandant, the Polish General Gorzhowsky, who told them that to no one on earth would he deliver the keys of the fortress except to his Emperor, and that the moment he could no longer defend it he would blow it into the air, with himself and half Mantua.  He showed them the flint and the steel with which he intended to do the deed.  Enemy though he was, that incident ought to be recorded in letters of gold on the gates of Mantua, as a perpetual lesson of that most difficult thing for a country founded in revolution to learn:  the meaning of a soldier’s duty.

It is easy to see that, if Charles Albert had made an immediate dash on Mantua, the fortress, or its ruins, would have been his, to the enormous detriment of the Austrian position.  But this chance too was missed.  On the 31st of March, the 9000 men sent with all speed by Radetsky to the defenceless fortress arrived, and henceforth Mantua was safe.  Charles Albert only got within fifteen or sixteen miles of it five days later, to find that all hope of its capture was gone.