That was a moment of excitement such as has not often thrilled Europe, but the cause was not the Infallibility of Pius IX.  On the 16th, Napoleon declared war with Prussia.  War, like death, comes as a shock, however plainly it has been foreseen; besides, it was only the well-informed who knew how near the match had been to the powder-magazine for two years and more.  Whether the explosion, at the last, was timed by Napoleon or by Bismarck is not of great importance; it could have been but little delayed.  Napoleon was beset alike by the revolutionary spectre and by the gaunt King of Terrors; he knew the throw was desperate, but with the gambler’s instinct, which had always been so strong in him, he was magnetised by it because it was desperate.  Pitiful egotist though he was, history may forgive him sooner than it forgives the selfish Chauvinism of Thiers, who had been goading his countrymen to war ever since Sadowa, or the insane bigotry of the party which, having triumphed over revolution at Mentana, now sought to triumph over heresy in what the Empress called ‘Ma guerre.’

Napoleon had the remaining sagacity to see the extreme danger of leaving a few thousand men isolated in Rome at a time when, happen what might, it would be impossible to reinforce them.  Directly after declaring war, notwithstanding the cries of the Ultramontanes, he decided on recalling the French troops.  He induced the Italian Government to resume the obligations of the September Convention, by which the inviolability of the Papal frontier was guaranteed.  Lanza is open to grave criticism for entering into a contract which it was morally certain that he would not be able to keep.  Perhaps he hoped that Napoleon would himself release Italy from her bond.  But the ‘Jamais’ of Rouher stood in the way.  Could the Emperor, after such boasting, coolly throw the Pope overboard the first time it suited his convenience?  Moreover, his present Prime Minister, M. Emile Olivier, when the question was put to him, did not hesitate to renew the declaration that the Italians must not be allowed to go to Rome.

Napoleon made some last frantic efforts to get Austria and Italy to befriend him unconditionally.  How far he knew the real state of his army before he declared war may be doubtful, but that he possessed overwhelming proof of it, even before the first defeats, cannot be doubted at all.  His heart was not so light as his Prime Minister’s.  At the end of July he sent General Tuerr on a secret mission to try and obtain the help of Austria and Italy.  The Hungarian general wrote from Florence, that unless something could be done to assure Italy that the national question would be settled in accordance with the wishes of her people, the Italian alliance was not possible.  The Convention, he pointed out, was a bane instead of a boon to Italy.  This letter was answered by a telegram through the French Ambassador at Vienna:  ’Can’t do anything for Rome; if Italy will not march, let her stand still.