In the spring the Prussian proposal to Italy was formally renewed, and this time it was accepted.  The secret treaty of an offensive and defensive alliance for three months was signed on the 8th of April.  Less than three weeks later, Austria, which was slowly beginning to feel some uneasiness, proposed to Napoleon the cession of Venetia, while exacting from Italy only a simple promise of neutrality in case of war.  General La Marmora held the honour of the country and his own to compel fidelity to the prior arrangement with Prussia, and he refused the tempting offer.  His choice has been variously characterised as one of common honesty and of uncommon magnanimity; at all events, it was of incalculable advantage to Prussia, which already gave signs of not being a particularly delicate-minded ally.  When La Marmora asked Bismarck whether, in case Austria took the initiative of attacking Italy, Prussia would intervene, the answer was ‘No.’

The three countries now pushed on their war preparations:  Austria with less ardour than the others, as she still failed to more than faintly realise her danger.  The Italian army, which the opening of the year found in a deplorably unserviceable condition, was rapidly placed on a war-footing, and, considering the shortness of the time allowed for the work, and the secrecy with which, at the outset, it had to be conducted, it is generally agreed that La Marmora produced surprising results.  As was natural in an army which, except for the old Piedmontese nucleus, might almost be called improvised, the weakest points were the cavalry and the artillery.  The infantry was good; not only the picked corps of Bersaglieri, but also the line regiments were equal to any troops likely to be opposed to them.  No one can see the fine appearance of a line regiment marching down the streets of an Italian town without receiving the impression that, however much the other branches of the service may have improved since the Sixties, the fondest hopes of Italy in case of war still lie in that common soldier who best supported the rigours of the Russian snows.

Unfortunately, the attention paid to the army was not extended to the fleet, which continued totally unready; nor was the organisation of the volunteers carried out in an efficient manner.  The excuse afterwards advanced was that not more than 15,000 enrolments were expected, while the actual figure reached 35,000.  Besides being from its very bulk less manageable than the ‘few and good’ of 1859, this mass of men was ill-provided with officers who could inspire and keep discipline.  Garibaldi’s own generals, Bixio, Medici, Cosenz and Sirtori, were now all in the regular army, and therefore not free to join him.  He begged for the loan of a few regular officers, indicating amongst other names that of Colonel Pallavicini, who commanded against him at Aspromonte:  a trait characteristic of the man.  But this assistance, though promised, was not granted, and the same was the case with the guns which were vainly asked for.  Without charging La Marmora with a deliberate intention of neglecting the volunteers, it must be owned that under the influence of the prejudice which holds irregular troops in small esteem, he did not do for them what ought to have been done if their services were accepted at all.