the Sardinian kingdom.  On the other hand, Garibaldi’s faith in Cavour had ceased with the cession of Nice, and he believed him to be even now contemplating the cession of the island of Sardinia as a further sop to Cerberus—­a project which, if it existed nowhere else, did exist in the mind of Napoleon III.  With regard to immediate annexation, he had no intention of agreeing to it, and for one sufficing reason:  had he consented he could not have carried the war of liberation across the Straits of Messina.  His Sicilian army must have laid down their arms at a command from Turin were it given.  And it would have been given.

La Farina, like Crispi, a Sicilian by birth, arrived suddenly at Palermo, representing Cavour, as everyone thought, but in reality he represented himself.  Strong-willed and prejudiced, he was, in his own way, a perfectly good patriot, and he had done all that was in his power (though not quite so much as in later years he fancied that he had done) to aid and further the expedition of the Thousand.  But he tried to force the annexation scheme by means so openly hostile to the government of the day, that Garibaldi at length sent him on board Persano’s flag-ship with a request that the admiral would forward him to Turin.

After the evacuation of Messina by the royal troops, Garibaldi received persuasions of all sorts to let the kingdom of Naples alone.  On the part of King Francis an offer was made to him of 50,000,000 francs and the Neapolitan navy in aid of a war for the liberation of Venice.  Almost simultaneously he received a letter from Victor Emmanuel sent by the hand of Count Giulio Litta, in which the writer said that in the event of the King of Naples giving up Sicily ’I think that our most reasonable course would be to renounce all ulterior undertakings against the Neapolitan kingdom.’  This was the first direct communication between the King and Garibaldi since the latter’s landing at Marsala; it is to be surmised that of indirect communications there had been several, and that they took the form of substantial assistance, sent, probably without Cavour being aware of it, for Victor Emmanuel carried on his own little conspiracies with a remarkable amount of secrecy.  What induced him now to address words of restraint to Garibaldi in the midway of his work, was the arrival of a letter from Napoleon III. in which the Emperor urged him in the strongest manner to use his well-known personal influence with the general to hold him back.  It was not easy for Victor Emmanuel to refuse point blank to make the last effort on behalf of his cousin.  Francis had appointed a constitutional ministry, promised a statute, granted an amnesty and engaged to place himself in accord with the King of Sardinia, adopted even the tricolor flag with the royal arms of Bourbon in the centre.  Concessions idle as desperate on the 25th of June 1860, the date which they bore.  Their only consequence then was to facilitate the