carefully watching all its early uncertain and changing
developments, even I do not feel competent to pass
definite judgment. Fascism is so large a part
of myself that it would be both arbitrary and absurd
for me to try to dissociate my personality from it,
to submit it to impartial scrutiny in order to evaluate
it coldly and accurately. What can be done, however,
and it seldom is attempted, is to make inquiry into
the phenomenon which shall not merely consider its
fragmentary and adventitious aspects, but strive to
get at its inner essence. The undertaking may
not be easy, but it is necessary, and no occasion
for attempting it is more suitable than the present
one afforded me by my friends of Perugia. Suitable
it is in time because, at the inauguration of a course
of lectures and lessons principally intended to illustrate
that old and glorious trend of the life and history
of Italy which takes its name from the humble saint
of Assisi, it seemed natural to connect it with the
greatest achievement of modern Italy, different in
so many ways from the Franciscan movement, but united
with it by the mighty common current of Italian History.
It is suitable as well in place because at Perugia,
which witnessed the growth of our religious ideas,
of our political doctrines and of our legal science
in the course of the most glorious centuries of our
cultural history, the mind is properly disposed and
almost oriented towards an investigation of this nature.
First of all let us ask ourselves if there is a political
doctrine of Fascism; if there is any ideal content
in the Fascist state. For in order to link Fascism,
both as concept and system, with the history of Italian
thought and find therein a place for it, we must first
show that it is thought; that it is a doctrine.
Many persons are not quite convinced that it is either
the one or the other; and I am not referring solely
to those men, cultured or uncultured, as the case may
be and very numerous everywhere, who can discern in
this political innovation nothing except its local
and personal aspects, and who know Fascism only as
the particular manner of behavior of this or that
well-known Fascist, of this or that group of a certain
town; who therefore like or dislike the movement on
the basis of their likes and dislikes for the individuals
who represent it. Nor do I refer to those intelligent,
and cultivated persons, very intelligent indeed and
very cultivated, who because of their direct or indirect
allegiance to the parties that have been dispossessed
by the advent of Fascism, have a natural cause of
resentment against it and are therefore unable to
see, in the blindness of hatred, anything good in it.
I am referring rather to those—and there
are many in our ranks too—who know Fascism
as action and feeling but not yet as thought, who therefore
have an intuition but no comprehension of it.