of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them, are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy.

    [Sidenote:  Chap.  X. 1621-1634]

“If this were merely an objection of taste, I should be willing to allow, that Grotius has indeed poured forth his learning with a profusion, that sometimes rather encumbers than adorns his work, and which is not always necessary to the illustration of his subject.  Yet, even in making, that concession, I should rather yield to the tastes of others, than speak from my own feelings.  I own that such richness and splendour of literature have a powerful charm for me.  They fill my mind with an endless variety of delightful recollections and associations.  They relieve the understanding in its progress through a vast science, by calling up the memory of great men and of interesting events.  By this means we see the truths of morality clothed with all the eloquence (not that could be produced by the powers of one man, but) that could be bestowed on them by the collective genius of the world.  Even virtue and wisdom themselves acquire new majesty in my eyes, when I thus see all the great masters of thinking and writing called together, as it were, from all times and countries, to do them homage and to appear in their train.

    [Sidenote:  X. 2.  His Treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis]

“But this is no piece for discussions of taste, and I am very ready to own, that mine may be corrupted.  The work of Grotius is liable to a more serious objection, though I do not recollect that it has ever been made.  His method is inconvenient and unscientific.  He has inverted the natural order.  That natural order undoubtedly dictates, that we should first search for the original principles of the science, in human nature; then apply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals; and lastly employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise with respect to the intercourse of nations.  But Grotius has chosen the reverse of this method.  He begins with the consideration of the states of peace and war, and he examines original principles, only occasionally and incidentally, as they grow out of the questions, which he is called upon to decide.  It is a necessary consequence of this disorderly method, which exhibits the elements of the science in the form of scattered digressions, that he seldom employs sufficient discussion on those fundamental truths, and never in the place where such a discussion would be most instructive to the reader.  This defect in the plan of Grotius was perceived, and supplied by Puffendorf, who restored natural law to that superiority which belonged to it, and with great propriety, treated the law of nations as only one main branch of the parent stock.”

[Sidenote:  CHAP X. 1621-1634]