The history is this.  In the year 1760 the allies were in the course of operations against the son of the Mogul, now the present Mogul, who, as I have already stated, had made an irruption into the kingdom of Bahar, in order to reduce the lower provinces to his obedience.  The parties opposing him were the Nabob of Bengal and the Company’s troops under Major Calliaud.  It was whilst they faced the common enemy as one body, this negotiation for the destruction of the Nabob of Bengal by his faithful allies of the Company was going on with diligence.  At that time the Nabob’s son, Meeran, a youth in the flower of his age, bold, vigorous, active, full of the politics in which those who are versed in usurpation are never wanting, commanded the army under his father, but was in reality the efficient person in all things.

About the 15th of April, 1760, as I have it from Major Calliaud’s letter of that date, the Nabob came into his tent, and, with looks of the utmost embarrassment, big with some design which swelled his bosom, something that was too large and burdensome to conceal, and yet too critical to be told, appeared to be in a state of great distraction.  The Major, seeing him in this condition, kindly, gently, like a fast and sure friend, employed (to use his own expression) some of those assurances that tend to make men fully open their hearts; and accordingly, fortified by his assurances, and willing to disburden himself of the secret that oppressed him, he opens his heart to the commanding officer of his new friends, allies, and protectors.  The Nabob, thus assured, did open himself, and informed Major Calliaud that he had just received a message from the Prince, or his principal minister, informing him that the Prince Royal, now the Mogul, had an intention (as, indeed, he rationally might, supposing that we were as well disposed to him as we showed ourselves afterwards) to surrender himself into the hands of him, the Nabob, but at the same time wished, as a guaranty, that the commander-in-chief of the English forces should give him security for his life and his honor, when he should in that manner surrender himself to the Nabob.  I do not mean, my Lords, by surrendering, that it was supposed he intended to surrender himself prisoner of war, but as a sovereign dubious of the fidelity of those about him would put himself into the hands of his faithful subjects, of those who claimed to derive all their power, as both we and the Nabob did, under his authority.  The Nabob stated to the English general, that without this English security the Prince would not deliver himself into his hands.  Here he confessed he found a difficulty.  For the giving this faith, if it were kept, would defeat his ultimate view, which was, when the Prince had delivered himself into his hands, in plain terms to murder him.  This grand act could not be accomplished without the English general.  In the first place, the Prince, without the English security, would not deliver himself into the Nabob’s hands; and afterwards, without the English concurrence, he could not be murdered.  These were difficulties that pressed upon the mind of the Nabob.