themselves belonging to the West.  They have therefore behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China.  And this same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the worst.  If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, they have practically none.  It is not yet too late; it is still possible for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best Americans.  To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell.  And their fall will be a great misfortune for mankind.

A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences.  It would destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide militaristic imperialism.  It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided.  If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will only become more liberal if the present regime is discredited by failure.  Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss.  Not that Japan has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant.  Our Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan’s mistakes, and the ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.

We come now to Russia’s part in the Chinese problem.  There is a tendency in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion.  True, millions are starving and industry is at a standstill.  But that does not mean what it would in a more highly organized country.  Russia is still able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the Japanese in Outer Mongolia.  Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik propaganda in every country in Asia.  And a great part of the effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from Europe.  So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of developing industry without passing through the stage of private capitalism.  This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are more and more forced to revert to capitalism.  Moreover, Bolshevism, as it has