The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory.  In Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented.  In time, if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a political force; as yet, I do not think it is.  Japanese Socialists resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the national superstitions.  They are much persecuted by the Government, but not so much as Socialists in America—­so at least I am informed by an American who is in a position to judge.

The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families.  By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister.  They therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the Foreign Office.  For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy.  Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable in this way.  There is of course a party which wishes to establish real Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless the existing regime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation.  If the Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal government of Japan would probably have been excellent.

The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that the Americana are their implacable foes.  One gathers that the Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run.  The argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield.  Then Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield in preference to starvation.  Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war.  This, of course, is romantic nonsense.  Bushido is no use in modern war, and the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese.  A war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of Japan.