All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the friction between America and Japan.  I wish to admit at once that, hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst enemy.  It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if there were a good prospect of victory.  On these grounds, I am glad to see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  But I do not wish this to be done in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the future good intentions of America.  I shall therefore try to state Japan’s case, although, for the present, I think it weaker than America’s.

It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American interests.  To take the naval question first:  America, with a navy equal to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us.  Control of the seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of American interests.  To take next the question of China:  American ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States.  The policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of the universal Open Door.  We cannot therefore regard America’s liberal policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.

In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight whatever.  I will cite two instances:  Panama tolls, and Russian trade.  In the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a discrimination in favour of American shipping.  Even if the President ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg’s view of treaty obligations.  And as for trade with Russia, England led the way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against “shaking hands with murder.”  It cannot therefore be said that America is always honourable or humanitarian or liberal.  The evidence is that America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.