province, that the Japanese should have the right to
construct certain specified railways, and that certain
ports (unspecified) should be opened to trade; also
that no privileges in Shantung should be granted to
any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands
what is in effect a protectorate, with control of
railways, complete economic freedom for Japanese enterprise,
and exclusion of all other foreign industrial enterprise.
The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines
and iron and steel works in a certain region of the
Yangtze,[63] where we claim a sphere of influence.
The fourth group consists of a single demand, that
China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to
any Power except Japan. The fifth group, which
was the most serious, demanded that Japanese political,
financial, and military advisers should be employed
by the Chinese Government; that the police in important
places should be administered by Chinese and Japanese
jointly, and should be largely Japanese in
personnel;
that China should purchase from Japan at least 50
per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese
arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese
experts and employing Japanese material; that Japan
should have the right to construct certain railways
in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan should
have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa);
and finally that the Japanese should have the right
of missionary propaganda in China, to spread the knowledge
of their admirable ethics.
These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete
loss of Chinese independence, the closing of important
areas to the commerce and industry of Europe and America,
and a special attack upon the British position in
the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the
war that we had no time to think of keeping ourselves
alive. Although the demands constituted a grave
menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an
uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic
action against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard
of them until they were explained to him by the Chinese
Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no time to find
out what Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret
agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that
whatever Japan wanted in Shantung we would support
at the Peace Conference.[65] By the terms of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the Twenty-one
Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan
communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth
and worst, thus definitely breaking the treaty;[66]
but this also, one must suppose, Mr. Lloyd George
only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.