The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult.  To provide for the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for wage-earners.  And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which the fabric of the State is built.  From without, Japan is threatened with the risk of war against America or of a revival of China.  From within, there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.

From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a diminution of the birth-rate.  But such an idea is not merely abhorrent to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which patriotism and filial piety are the basis.  Therefore if Japan is to emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but ideals and religion and general outlook on life.  There must be free thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct.  Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable.

FOOTNOTES: 

[Footnote 46:  McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.]

[Footnote 47:  Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.]

[Footnote 48:  “What popular Shinto, as expounded by its village priests in the old time, was we simply do not know.  Our carefully selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight.” (Murdoch, I, p. 173 n.)]

[Footnote 49:  The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted.  Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says:  “At present, 1910, the War Office and Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire.  When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to regard its advent with the utmost insouciance.  For tho most extreme of party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan.  On none in the public service of Japan are titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the great sailors of the Empire.  In China, on the other hand, the military man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension.”]