From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom in the conduct of affairs.  There is reason to think that if Japan were a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is.  Apologists of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to dominate foreign policy.  I see no reason to believe this.  Undoubtedly there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy.  There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese industrialism grows.  But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so.  Indeed there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed if the Government had been democratic.  One of the most interesting of these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of Japanese politics.[50]

In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land.  The Russian Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the Siberian railway.  The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a prolongation of the war.  Under these circumstances, Japan appealed secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the restoration of peace.  President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations to both belligerents to a peace conference.  The Russian Government, faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of neutrals were on the whole with Japan.  Japan, being anxious for peace, led Russia to suppose that Japan’s demands would be so excessive as to alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the peace party in Russia.  In particular, the Japanese gave out that they would absolutely insist upon an indemnity.  The Government had in fact resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan.  The Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the indemnity, showed themselves