government is the prerequisite of all other reforms.  Industrialism and education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to oust them.  These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought to be taken in the above order.

1. The establishment of an orderly government.—­At the moment of writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been.  A battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though The Times calls him “the Liberal leader,” may well prove no more satisfactory than “Liberal” leaders nearer home.  It is of course possible that, if he wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not.  In any case, to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power.  If the progressive elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.

So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of military usurpation.  Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice of cherished beliefs on the part of some.  Given a programme upon which all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in public opinion, which is very powerful in China.  They may then be able, sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere military force.  By this means they may be able to turn the scales in favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party.  Such a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded.  This raises the financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap.  X., I do not accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from them would not involve control over China’s internal affairs.  They may not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese merchants.  There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the Government.