It will be granted, that the line of equity ought to be drawn with critical exactness.

If by fair trade, persuasion, or finesse, I get the property of another into my hands, even to the trifling value of a shilling, my effects ought to be responsible for that sum.

If I possess no effects, he certainly retains a right of punishing to that amount:  for if we do not lay this line in the boundaries of strict justice, it will not lie upon any other ground.  And if I am allowed fraud in one shilling, I am allowed it in a greater sum.  How far punishment may be softened by concurring circumstances, is another question.

It therefore follows of course, that if my creditor has a right to recover his unfortunate property, those laws are the nearest to perfection, that will enable him to recover it with the most expedition, and the least expence and trouble to us both.

If the charge of recovery is likely to exceed the debt, he will be apt to desist, I to laugh at him, and to try my skill at a second enterprize.

Trade and credit cannot be well separated; they are as closely connected as the wax and the paper.  The laws of credit, therefore, ought to rest upon a permanent foundation:  neither is law necessary to restrain credit; for if, in a commercial state, it becomes detrimental by its over growth, it finds itself a remedy.

Much has been said, and perhaps more than has been thought, concerning the court before us.  The loser is expected to complain, and his friends to give him a partial hearing; and though he breathes vengeance against his antagonist, it ends in a breath.

The looker-on can easily spy an error in the actor.  If a fault is committed, we are glad it was done by another; besides, it is no new thing for the outs to complain of the ins.  It will plead strongly in excuse, to say, the intention was right, if the judgment was wrong.  If perfection is required, she does not reside upon earth.

But if these pleadings are not found a balance against prejudice, and a man suffers his wrath to kindle against a valuable institution, because perfection does not preside over it, let him peruse an old author, who asks, “What shall we think of the folly of that man, who throws away the apple, because it contains a core? despises the nut, for the shell? or casts the diamond into the sea, because it has a flaw?”

Decision is usually established upon oath, both in criminal courts, and in those at Westminster, through which the oath is seen to pass with free currency.

A judge is sometimes fond of sheltering himself behind an oath; it may be had at an easy rate.  Each of the contending parties wishes to win his cause by an oath:  but though oaths would be willingly taken, they ought to be sparingly given.—­They may be considered what they generally are not, of the last importance.

We may observe, that two opponents are ready to swear directly contrary to each other; that if a man asserts a thing, he can do no less than swear it; and that, after all, an oath proves nothing.