the result of my life’s work. I have devoted
my whole life to the study of Nature, and yet a single
sentence may express all that I have done. I have
shown that there is a correspondence between the succession
of Fishes in geological times and the different stages
of their growth in the egg,—this is all.
It chanced to be a result that was found to apply to
other groups and has led to other conclusions of a
like nature. But, such as it is, it has been
reached by this system of comparison, which, though
I speak of it now in its application to the study
of Natural History, is equally important in every
other branch of knowledge. By the same process
the most mature results of scientific research in
Philology, in Ethnology, and in Physical Science are
reached. And let me say that the community should
foster the purely intellectual efforts of scientific
men as carefully as they do their elementary schools
and their practical institutions, generally considered
so much more useful and important to the public.
For from what other source shall we derive the higher
results that are gradually woven into the practical
resources of our life, except from the researches of
those very men who study science not for its uses,
but for its truth? It is this that gives it its
noblest interest: it must be for truth’s
sake, and not even for the sake of its usefulness
to humanity, that the scientific man studies Nature.
The application of science to the useful arts requires
other abilities, other qualities, other tools than
his; and therefore I say that the man of science who
follows his studies into their practical application
is false to his calling. The practical man stands
ever ready to take up the work where the scientific
man leaves it, and to adapt it to the material wants
and uses of daily life.
The publication of Cuvier’s proposition, that
the animal kingdom is built on four plans, created
an extraordinary excitement throughout the scientific
world. All naturalists proceeded to test it, and
many soon recognized in it a great scientific truth,—while
others, who thought more of making themselves prominent
than of advancing science, proposed poor amendments,
that were sure to be rejected on farther investigation.
There were, however, some of these criticisms and
additions that were truly improvements, and touched
upon points overlooked by Cuvier. Blainville,
especially, took up the element of form among animals,—whether
divided on two sides, whether radiated, whether irregular,
etc. He, however, made the mistake of giving
very elaborate names to animals already known under
simpler ones. Why, for instance, call all animals
with parts radiating in every direction Actinomorpha
or Actinozoaria, when they had received the
significant name of Radiates? It seemed,
to be a new system, when in fact it was only a new
name. Ehrenberg, likewise, made an important
distinction, when he united the animals according to
the difference in their nervous systems; but he also
incumbered the nomenclature unnecessarily, when he
added to the names Anaima and Enaima
of Aristotle those of Myeloneura and Ganglioneura.