of nations; but the law itself has no locality.  It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question, if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances; and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain, in the same character.  If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider, and which I mean should be considered, as universal law upon the question.”

When an Admiralty Judge investigates the law in this impartial spirit, he occupies the grand position of being in some respects the director of the deeds of nations; but with equal certainty does the taint of an unjust bias poison all his authority; his judgments are powerful then only for evil; they bind no one beyond the country in which he sits, and may become the motive and origin of reprisal and attack upon his native land.

As the authority of the international judge depends on his integrity, so also does the universal law arise from, and remain supported by, the true principles of right and justice; in other words, by the fundamental distinction between right and wrong.  A statute, a despotic prerogative, and an established principle of common law, rest upon different sanctions.  They may be the causes of the greatest injustice, may sow the seeds of national ruin, and yet may even require revolutions for their reformation; but any one of the laws of nations preserves its vitality, only with the essential truth of its principles; a change in the feeling of mankind on the great question of real justice, destroys it, and it simply remains an historical record of departed opinion, or a point from which to date an advance or retreat in the career of the human mind.

It is for this reason that International Law has been so differently defined by writers at various periods.

The Law of Nations is founded, I have said, on the general principles of right and justice, on the broad fundamental distinctions between right and wrong, or as Montesquieu defines it, “on the principle that nations ought in time of peace to do each as much good, and in time of war as little harm as possible.”  These are the principles from which any rule must be shown to spring, before it can be said to be a rule for international guidance.  But what are the principles of right and wrong?  These are not left to the individual reason of the interpreter of the law for the time being, but are to be decided by the public opinion of the civilized world, as it stands at the time when the case arises.