[Footnote CV:  P. 201.]

[Footnote CW:  Cf. chapter vii.]

[Footnote CX:  It seems desirable to guard against an inference that might be made from what I have said about Hegel’s “Nothing.”  Hegel saw clearly that his “Nothing” was only the farthest limit of abstraction, and that it was consequently absolutely empty and worthless.  It was only his starting point of thought, not his end, as in the case of Brahmanism and of Buddhism.  Only after Hegel had passed the “Nothing” through all the successive stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and thus clothed it with the fullness of being and character, did he conceive it to be the concrete, actual Absolute.  There is, therefore, the farthest possible difference between Hegel’s Absolute Being and Buddha’s Absolute.  Hegel sought to understand and state in rational form the real nature of the Christian’s conception of God.  Whether he did so or not, this is not the place to say.]

[Footnote CY:  I remark, in passing, that Western non-Christian thought has experienced, and still experiences, no little difficulty in conceiving the ultimate nature of being, and thus in solving the problem, into which, as a cavernous tomb, the speculative religions of the Orient have fallen.  Western non-Christian systems, whether materialism, consistent agnosticism, impersonal pantheism, or other systems which reject the Christian conception of God as perfect personality endowed with all the fullness of being and character, equally with philosophic Buddhism, fail to provide any theoretic foundation for the doctrine of the value of man as man, and consequently fail to provide any guarantee for individualism in the social order and the wide development of personality among the masses.]

[Footnote CZ:  Cf. chapter vi.]

[Footnote DA:  Foot of chapter xxix.]

[Footnote DB:  Chapter xxxiii. p. 498.]

[Footnote DC:  It seems desirable to append a brief additional statement on the doctrine of the “personality of God,” and its acceptability to the Japanese.  I wish to make it clear, in the first place, that the difficulties felt by the Japanese in adopting this doctrine are not due primarily to the deficiency either of the Japanese language or to the essential nature of the Japanese mind, that is to say, because of its asserted structural “impersonality.”  We have seen how the entire thought of the people, and even the direct moral teachings, imply both the fact of personality in man, and also its knowledge.  The religious teachings, likewise, imply the personality even of “Heaven.”