At one period in the history of Buddhism in Japan, prolonged public discussions were all the fashion.  Priests traveled from temple to temple to engage in public debate.  The ablest debater was the abbot, and he had to be ready to face any opponent who might appear.  If a stranger won, the abbot yielded his place and his living to the victor.  Many an interesting story is told of those times, and of the crowds that would gather to hear the debates.  But our point is that this incident in the national life shows the appreciation of the people for philosophical questions.  And although that particular fashion has long since passed away, the national interest in discussions and arguments still exists.  No monks of the West ever enjoyed hair-splitting arguments more than do many of the Japanese.  They are as adept at mental refinements and logical juggling as any people of the West, though possibly the Hindus excel them.

If it be said that Confucianism was not only non-metaphysical, but uniquely practical, and for this reason found wide acceptance in Japan, the reply must be first that, professing to be non-metaphysical, it nevertheless had a real metaphysical system of thought in the background to which it ever appealed for authority, a system, be it noted, more in accord with modern science and philosophy than Buddhist metaphysics; and secondly, although Confucianism became the bulwark of the state and the accepted faith of the samurai, it was limited to them.  The vast majority of the nation clung to their primitive Buddhistic cosmology.  That Confucianism rested on a clearly implied and more or less clearly expressed metaphysical foundation may be seen in the quotations from the writings of Muro Kyuso which are given in chapter xxiv.  We should note that the revolt of the educated classes of Japan from Buddhism three hundred years ago, and their general adoption of Confucian doctrine, was partly in the interests of religion and partly in the interests of metaphysics.  In both respects the progressive part of the nation had become dissatisfied with Buddhism.  The revolt proves not lack of religious or metaphysical interest and insight, but rather the reverse.

Not a little of the teaching of Shushi (1130-1200 A.D.) and of Oyomei (1472-1528 A.D.), Chinese philosophical expounders of Confucianism, is metaphysical.  The doctrine of the former was widely studied and was the orthodox doctrine in Japan for more than two centuries, all other doctrine and philosophy being forbidden by the state.  It is true that the central interest in this philosophical instruction was the ethical.  It was felt that the entire ethical system rested on the acceptance of a particular metaphysical system.  But so far from detracting from our argument this statement rather adds.  For in what land has not the prime interest in metaphysics been ethical?  A study of the history of philosophy shows clearly that philosophy and metaphysics arose out of religious