mud, and the general conclusions which the German Higher Command drew from the derelict tanks they captured during the fighting of October, 1917, were entirely misleading, as they soon discovered to their cost, a few weeks later, in the First Battle of Cambrai.  They showed, indeed, throughout a curious lack of intelligence and foresight with regard to the new weapon, both as to its possibilities and as to the means of fighting it.  They were at first entirely surprised by their appearance in the field; then they despised them; and it was not till July and August, 1918, at the beginning of the last great Allied offensive—­when it will be remembered that Sir Henry Rawlinson had 400 tanks under his command—­that the Germans awoke—­too late—­to the full importance of the new arm.

Thenceforward “the enemy was overcome by a great fear of the Allied tanks, and in some cases even over-estimated their effect.”  But it was now too late to put up an adequate defence against “the more dangerous tanks,” which were already available in large numbers on the Allied side.  It seems incredible, but it is true, that the Germans never possessed at any time more than fifteen tanks of their own, plus some twenty-five captured and repaired British tanks; and the only action in which they employed them with any considerable success was at the capture of Villers Bretonneux, April 24th, 1918 (the success which was so quickly turned into defeat by the Australians).  After last July, however, the German panic with regard to them grew rapidly, and on the 15th of August we find it stated that everything possible must be done to give the artillery “freedom of action in its main role, viz., the engagement of tanks.”  “Its main role!” The phrase shows that under the pressure of the tanks, the two chief pillars and axioms of the former German defence system—­“protective barrages” and “immediate counter-attack”—­were giving way, in the case at least of tank attacks, with, of course, the natural result of confusion and weakness.  After the Battle of Amiens (August 8th) the German Command issued an explanation of the defeat, signed by Ludendorff.  Chief among the reasons given appears:  “The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of tanks, and lost their heads when the tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under cover of fog and smoke.”  The Crown Prince’s group of armies reports on the same battle:  “That during the present fighting large numbers of tanks broke through on narrow fronts, and, pushing straight forward, rapidly attacked battery positions and the headquarters of divisions.  In many cases no defence could be made in time against the tanks, which attacked them from all sides.”

And the peremptory order follows: 

    “Messages concerning tanks will have priority over all other
    messages or calls whatsoever.”