And, moreover, our unpreparedness, and the fact that we were not able to take a full share in the war till the summer of 1916, terribly wasted the man-power of France.  “The excessive burden,” says Marshal Haig, “thrown upon the gallant Army of France during that period caused them losses the effect of which has been felt all through the war and directly influenced its length.”  Meanwhile, what might have been “the effect of British intervention on a larger scale, in the earlier stages of the war, is shown by what was actually achieved by our original Expeditionary Force.”

Who was responsible for this unpreparedness?

Sir Douglas Haig does not raise the question.  But those of us who remember the political history of the years from 1906 to 1914 can hardly be in doubt as to the answer.  It was the Radical and anti-militarist group of the Liberal party then in power, who every year fought the Naval and Military Estimates—­especially the latter—­point by point, and stubbornly hampered the most necessary military provision, on whom, little as they intended or foresaw it, a tragic responsibility for the prolongation of the war, and the prodigal loss of life it involved, must always rest.  Lord Haldane, indeed during his years of office as the War Minister of the Liberal Government, made a gallant fight for the Army.  To him we owe the Expeditionary Force, the Territorials, the organisation of the General Staff, the Officers’ Training Corps; and without his reforms our case would have been black indeed when the storm broke.  No one has repelled more indignantly the common Tory charges against Lord Haldane than Sir Douglas Haig himself.  But, during his years at the War Office Lord Haldane was fighting against heavy odds, attacked on the one hand by the upholders of Lord Roberts’s scheme, in which neither he nor the General Staff believed, and under perpetual sniping on the other from the extreme section of his own party.  The marvel is that he was able to do what he did!

Granting, however, the unpreparedness of England, what a wonderful story it is on which Sir Douglas Haig looks back!  First, the necessary opening stage of this or any war—­i.e., a preliminary phase of manoeuvring for position, on both sides, which came to an end with “the formation of continuous trench lines from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier.”  Then, when British military power had developed, followed “the period of real struggle,” in which the main forces of the two belligerent Armies were pitted against each other in close and costly combat—­i.e., “the wearing-down battle” which must go on in this war, as in all wars where large and equal forces are engaged, till one or the other combatant begins to weaken.  And, finally, the last stage, when the weakening combatant stakes “on a supreme effort what reserves remain to him,” and must abide by the issue.  Germany staked her last reserves in the “great sortie” of her beleaguered Armies, which lasted from April to July of 1918.  She lost the game, and the end, which was inevitable, followed quickly.