It was a brilliant but happily not a costly victory.  Von Gallwitz, the German Commander, had probably already determined on retirement, when the American attack forestalled him.  So that the American troops with certain French units supporting them achieved a great result with small losses; and as the first battle of an independent American Army the operation must always remain one of extraordinary interest and importance, even though, in British military opinion, the palm of difficulty and of sacrifice must be given rather to the splendid fighting on the Marne in June and July, when the Americans were still under French direction, or to the admirable performance of the two American divisions, the 27th and the 30th, serving under Sir Henry Rawlinson, a fortnight after St. Mihiel, on the Hindenburg line.  “The original attack,” at St. Mihiel, says one of the keenest of British military observers—­“was carried out with extraordinary dash by very eager and physically magnificent soldiers.”  Possibly, he adds, a more seasoned army—­the American troops had only had six months’ experience in the fighting line!—­might have turned the effects of a successful action to greater military advantage than was the case at St. Mihiel.  The British or French critic, mindful of the bitter lessons of four years of war, is inclined to make the same criticism of most of the American operations of last year, except the fighting on the Marne in June and July, when French caution and experience found a wonderful complement in the splendid fighting qualities of the American infantry.  “But”—­adds one of them—­“undoubtedly the American Command was learning very rapidly.”  What an army the American Army would have been, if the war had lasted through this year!  The qualities of the individual soldier, drawn many of them from districts among the naturally richest in the world, together with the vast resources in men and wealth of the nation behind them, and the mastery of the lessons of modern war which was already promised by the American Command, during the six months’ campaign of 1918—­above all, the comparative freshness of the American effort—­would, no doubt, have made the United States Army the leading force among the Allies, had the war been prolonged.  That is one line of speculation, and an interesting one.  Another, less profitable, asks:  “Could the Allies have won without America?” The answer I have heard most commonly given is:  “Probably yes, considering, especially, the disintegration we now know to have been going on in Germany, and the cumulative effects of the British blockade.  But it would have taken at least six months more fighting, the loss of thousands more precious and irreplaceable lives, and the squandering of vast additional wealth in the bottomless waste of war.”

Thank God, we did not win without America!  The effects, the far-reaching effects, of America’s intervention, of her comradeship in the field of suffering and sacrifice with the free nations of old Europe, are only now beginning to show themselves above the horizon.  They will be actively and, as at least the men and women of faith among us believe, beneficently at work, when this generation has long passed away.