British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but they were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of the American Secretary of State.  May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell in comment on Lyons’ despatch of May 2:  “These communications are very unpleasant.  It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish and uncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from political calculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222].”  He believed that more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionary measure, but, he added, “the main Force for Defence must, of course, be local”—­a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by British Ministers.  Russell was less perturbed.  He had previously expressed appreciation of Adams’ conduct, writing to Lyons:  “Mr. Adams has made a very favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223],” and he now wrote:  “I do not think Mr. Seward’s colleagues will encourage him in a game of brag with England....  I am sorry Seward turns out so reckless and ruthless.  Adams seems a sensible man[224].”  But at Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours.  As a result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, not Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6, stating:  “No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain appears to me by no means impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225].”  This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon the probability of war, and ending with Lyons’ opinion of how it should be conducted.  England should strike at once with the largest possible naval force and bring the war to an end before the United States could prepare.  Otherwise, “the spirit, the energy, and the resources of this people” would make them difficult to overcome.  England, on her part, must be prepared to suffer severely from American privateers, and she would be forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping Southern ports open.  Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter and advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled to write it by the seriousness of the situation.  Nevertheless, he would exert every effort and use every method to conciliate America[226].

In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that had so renewed Lyons’ anxiety.  Rather it was the public and Press reception of the news of the Queen’s Proclamation of Neutrality.  The Northern people, counting beyond all reasonable expectation upon British sympathy on anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily disappointed, and were at the moment loudly voicing their vexation.  Had Seward not already been turned from his foreign war policy he now would have received strong public support in it.  But he made no effort to utilize public excitement to his own advantage in the Cabinet.  In England, Adams was able to report on June 14 that