war.  Even the positive instructions, later in the despatch, as to the Southern Commissioners, need not have been acted upon by Adams had he not thought it wise to do so.  But even with alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarm Adams.  On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, “The Government seems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of Europe, and almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with the Ministers here in a certain contingency....  I scarcely know how to understand Mr. Seward.  The rest of the Government may be demented for all I know; but he surely is calm and wise.  My duty here is in so far as I can do it honestly to prevent the irritation from coming to a downright quarrel.  It seems to me like throwing the game into the hands of the enemy[212].”

Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the source of American belligerent attitude.  Fortunately, his judgment of what was wise at the moment coincided with that of Lincoln’s—­though of this he had no knowledge.  In the event Adams’ skilful handling of the situation resulted favourably—­even to the cessation of intercourse between Russell and the Southern Commissioners.  For his part, Lincoln, no more than earlier, was to be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward’s “foreign war panacea” was stillborn.

The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for Seward at last realized that the President intended to control policy, and though it was yet long before he came to appreciate fully Lincoln’s customary calm judgment, he did understand the relation now established between himself and his chief.  Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though free in suggestion and criticism, always welcome to Lincoln.  The latter, avowedly ignorant of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the altered despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them simple and easy, by clearing the atmosphere.  But it was otherwise with Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a “leak” of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard to Despatch No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of influence by Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy.  This was particularly true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was against England that Seward most directed his enmity.  There resulted for British diplomats both at Washington and in London a deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long after he had made a complete face-about in policy.  This suspicion influenced relations greatly in the earlier years of the Civil War.

On May 20, the day before Seward’s No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote a long twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of Seward’s warlike projects.  “The President is, of course, wholly ignorant of foreign countries, and of foreign affairs.”  “Seward, having lost strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking to recover influence by leading a foreign