Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell “refuses to pledge himself” on British policy, Seward resorts to threats.  What other explanation is possible except that, seeking to save his domestic policy of conciliation and to regain his leadership, he now was adventuring toward the application of his “foreign war panacea” idea.  Lyons quickly learned of the changed tone, and that England, especially, was to hear American complaint.  On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell in cypher characterizing Seward as “arrogant and reckless toward Foreign Powers[208].”  Evidently Seward was making little concealment of his belligerent attitude, and when the news was received of the speeches in Parliament of the first week in May by which it became clear that Great Britain would declare neutrality and was planning joint action with France, he became much excited.  On May 17 he wrote a letter home exhibiting, still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his own foreign policy.

“A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to save it had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence, needful to that end.  I am a chief reduced to a subordinate position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do too much for my country, lest some advantage may revert indirectly to my own fame.

“...  They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe, Great Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to make war against her, as the ally of the traitors....  I am trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cabinet before it is too late[209].”

The “bold remonstrance” was the famous “Despatch No. 10,” of May 21, already commented upon in the preceding chapter.  But as sent to Adams it varied in very important details from the draft submitted by Seward to Lincoln[210].

Seward’s draft was not merely a “remonstrance”; it was a challenge.  Its language implied that the United States desired war, and Seward’s plan was to have Adams read the despatch to Russell, give him a copy of it, and then discontinue diplomatic relations so long as Russell held either official or unofficial intercourse with the Southern Commissioners.  This last instruction was, indeed, retained in the final form of the despatch, but here, as elsewhere, Lincoln modified the stiff expressions of the original.  Most important of all, he directed Adams to consider the whole despatch as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion.  The despatch, as amended, began with the statement that the United States “neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the sensibilities of that or any other European nation....  The paper itself is not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of State, nor any of its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, or indiscreetly made known.  But its spirit will be your guide[211].”  Thus were the teeth skilfully drawn from the threat of