This should have been clear indication of Lincoln’s will to direct affairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had he not, momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific policy toward the South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of Lincoln’s quiet persistence.  As it was, he yielded on the immediate issue, the relief of Sumter (though attempting to divert reinforcements to another quarter) but did not as yet wholly yield either his policy of conciliation and delay, nor give up immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union by plunging it into a foreign war.  He was, in fact, still giving assurances to the Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that he could and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in this confidence that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained up to the second week in April.  But on April 8 the first of the ships despatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day Governor Pickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the Northern purpose.  This threw the burden of striking the first blow upon the South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war seemed inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the quarrel.

The reinforcements did not arrive in time.  Fort Sumter, after a day and a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on April 13—­for as an enemy in arms the South now stood.  The fall of Sumter changed, as in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern people.  There was now a nearly unanimous cry for the preservation of the Union by force.  Yet Seward still clung, privately, to his belief that even now the “sober second thought” of the South would offer a way out toward reunion without war.  In official utterances and acts he was apparently in complete harmony with the popular will to reconquer the South.  Davis’ proclamation on marque and privateering, of April 17, was answered by the Lincoln blockade proclamation of April 19.  But Virginia had not yet officially seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at least one last straw of conciliation available.  In this situation Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of April 24 and offered his services as a mediator[204].

Schleiden’s idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the South until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving a breathing spell and permitting saner second judgment to both sides.  He had consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, and he found Seward favourable to the plan.  Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to him, as an old friend, Schleiden proposed to go and make the same appeal.  Seward at once took Schleiden to see Lincoln.  The three men, with Chase (and the Prussian Minister) were the only ones in the secret.  Lincoln’s first comment was that he was “willing to make an attempt of contributing