This was a sharp blow to Seward’s prestige in the Cabinet; it also threatened his “peaceful” policy.  Yet he did not as yet understand fully that either supreme leadership, or control of policy, had been assumed by Lincoln.  On April 1 he drafted that astonishing document entitled, “Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration,” which at once reveals his alarm and his supreme personal self-confidence.  This document begins, “We are at the end of a month’s administration, and yet without a policy either domestic or foreign.”  It then advocates as a domestic policy, “Change The Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery, Or About Slavery, for a question upon Union or Disunion.”  Then in a second section, headed “For Foreign Nations,” there followed: 

     “I would demand explanations from Spain and France,
     categorically, at once.

“I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

     “And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from
     Spain and France.

     “Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

     “But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic
     prosecution of it.

     “For this purpose it must be somebody’s business to pursue
     and direct it incessantly.

     “Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
     while active in it, or

     “Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet.  Once adopted,
     debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

     “It is not in my especial province;

     “But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility[202].”

Lincoln’s reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically gentle, yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed with his own superior wisdom.  Lincoln merely noted that Seward’s “domestic policy” was exactly his own, except that he did not intend to abandon Fort Sumter.  As to the warlike foreign policy Lincoln pointed out that this would be a sharp reversal of that already being prepared in circulars and instructions to Ministers abroad.  This was, indeed, the case, for the first instructions, soon despatched, were drawn on lines of recalling to foreign powers their established and long-continued friendly relations with the United States.  Finally, Lincoln stated as to the required “guiding hand,” “I remark that if this must be done, I must do it....  I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet[203].”