but his supremacy was not unchallenged and soon a decision was called for that in its final solution was to completely overthrow his already matured policy towards the seceding States.  Buchanan had been pressed by South Carolina to yield possession of federal property in that State and especially to withdraw Federal troops from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour.  After some vacillation he had refused to do this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and re-supply the weak garrison under the command of Major Anderson.  On March 5, Lincoln learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded unless reinforcements were sent.  There followed ten days of delay and indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of his Cabinet an opinion on what should be done.  This brought to an issue the whole question of Seward’s policy and leadership.

For Seward’s policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of conciliatory delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, and trusting to time and a sobering second thought to bring Southern leaders and people to a less violent attitude.  He sincerely believed in the existence of an as yet unvoiced strong Union sentiment in the South, especially in those States which were wavering on secession.  He was holding communications, through intermediaries, with certain Confederate “Commissioners” in Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence that State against secession.  To all these Southern representatives he now conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that Sumter would be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own “policy” would be approved by the President.  His argument in reply to Lincoln’s call for an opinion was positive against reinforcing Fort Sumter, and it seemed to meet, for the moment, with the approval of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues.  Lincoln himself made no pertinent comment, yet did not commit himself.

There the matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners, regarding Seward’s policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the maturing of Southern plans, and Seward “as their cat’s-paw[201],” did not care to press for a decision.  Moreover, Seward had given a personal pledge that in case it were, after all, determined to reinforce Sumter, notification of that determination would at once be given to South Carolina.  The days went by, and it was not until the last week of March that Lincoln, disillusioned as to the feasibility of Seward’s policy of conciliation, reached the conclusion that in his conception of his duty as President of the United States he must defend and retain Federal forts, or attempt to retain them, for the preservation of the Union, and decided to reinforce Fort Sumter.  On March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon and learned Lincoln’s determination.