a method of escape.  Joint cruising squadrons were provided for the coast of Africa, the British to search all suspected vessels except those flying the American flag, and these to be searched by the American squadron.  At once President Tyler notified Congress that Great Britain had renounced the right of search.  Immediately in Parliament a clamour was raised against the Government for the “sacrifice” of a British right at sea, and Lord Aberdeen promptly made official disclaimer of such surrender.

Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of peace was a steady irritant.  America doubted somewhat the honesty of Great Britain, appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose, but suspicious of an ulterior “will to rule the seas.”  After 1830 no American political leader would have dared to yield the right of search.  Great Britain for her part, viewing the expansion of domestic slavery in the United States, came gradually to attribute the American contention, not to patriotic pride, but to the selfish business interests of the slave-holding states.  In the end, in 1858, with a waning British enthusiasm for the cause of slave trade suppression, and with recognition that America had become a great world power, Britain yielded her claim to right of search or visit, save when established by Treaty.  Four years later, in 1862, it may well have seemed to British statesmen that American slavery had indeed been the basic cause of America’s attitude, for in that year a treaty was signed by the two nations giving mutual right of search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade.  In fact, however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of State for the North, to influence British and European opinion against the seceding slave states of the South.

The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when American power reached a point where the British Government must take it seriously into account as a factor in general world policy.  That power had been steadily and rapidly advancing since 1814.  From almost the first moment of established independence American statesmen visualized the separation of the interests of the western continent from those of Europe, and planned for American leadership in this new world.  Washington, the first President, emphasized in his farewell address the danger of entangling alliances with Europe.  For long the nations of Europe, immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in this new world.  Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward, but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France, commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened in Spain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about to intervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted colonies, there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly about to draw America and England into closer co-operation.  Canning, for Britain, proposed to America a joint declaration against French intervention in the Americas.  His argument was against the principle of intervention; his immediate motive was a fear of French colonial expansion; but his ultimate object was inheritance by Britain of Spain’s dying influence and position in the new world.