“We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians, that it does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern leaders that they are half inclined to become British once more.  Both sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans over here.  On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily.

“For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of events has induced us to regard the dispute as a more commonplace kind of quarrel than it at first appeared to be.  The real motives of the belligerents, as the truth transpires; appear to be exactly such motives as have caused wars in all times and countries.  They are essentially selfish motives—­that is to say, they are based upon speculations of national power, territorial aggrandizement, political advantage, and commercial gain.  Neither side can claim any superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of patriotism....

“We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to remove the case from the common category of national or monarchical quarrels.  The representations of the North might be made word for word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous of ‘rectifying’ his frontier, consolidating his empire, or retaining a disaffected province in subjection.  The manifestos of the South might be put forth by any State desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion or exchanging union for independence....

“It is just such a question as has been left times out of mind in this Old World to the decision of the sword.  The sword will be the arbitrator in the New World too; but the event teaches us plainly enough that Republics and Democracies enjoy no exemption from the passions and follies of humanity.”

Under these impressions Adams presented himself on May 18 for his first interview with Russell[169].  He stated that he had come with the idea that there was

“.... little to do beyond the duty of preserving the relations actually existing between the two nations from the risk of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate domestic disturbances prevailing in my own country.  It was not without pain that I was compelled to admit that from the day of my arrival I had felt in the proceedings of both houses of Parliament, in the language of Her Majesty’s ministers, and in the tone of opinion prevailing in private circles, more of uncertainty about this than I had before thought possible,”

Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to Dallas refusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South implied a British purpose “to adopt a policy which would have the effect to widen, if not to make irreparable, a breach [between North and South] which we believed yet to be entirely manageable by ourselves.”

Russell here replied that “there was no such intention”; he had simply meant to say to Dallas that the British Government “were not disposed in any way to interfere.”  To this Adams answered that: