the North would have no right to treat them as such, but if the North in defiance of international opinion did so treat them, Great Britain had at least warned its subjects that they, if engaged in service on a Southern privateer, had no claim to British protection; a blockade of the South to be respected must be effective at least to the point where a vessel attempting to pass through was likely to be captured; the plan of blockading the entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles of coast line, was on the face of it ridiculous—­evidence that Members of Parliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of the Southern seaboard[165].

The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for one side in the American quarrel above the other.  It turned wholly on legal questions and their probable application.  On May 15 Russell sent to Lyons the official text of the Proclamation, but did not instruct him to communicate it officially to Seward, leaving this rather to Lyons’ discretion.  This was discretionary in diplomatic usage since in strict fact the Proclamation was addressed to British subjects and need not be communicated officially to the belligerents.  In the result the discretion permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognition of Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which the Northern Government was attempting to proceed.  Lyons did not then, or later, make official communication to Seward of the Proclamation[166].  The fact soon appeared that the United States seriously objected to the Proclamation of Neutrality, protesting first, its having been issued at all, and, in the second place, resenting what was considered its “premature” announcement by a friendly nation.  This matter developed so serious a criticism by both American Government and public, both during and after the Civil War, that it requires a close examination.  Did the British Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a “premature” Proclamation of Neutrality?

On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on the morning of the fourteenth he was “ready for business” in London[167], but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas was prevented by the illness of Russell’s brother, the Duke of Bedford[168].  All that was immediately possible was to make official notification of arrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen.  This was promptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented, Palmerston attending in the enforced absence of Russell.  Adams’ first report to Seward was therefore brief, merely noting that public opinion was “not exactly what we would wish.”  In this he referred to the utterances of the press, particularly those of the Times, which from day to day and with increasing vigour sounded the note of strict neutrality in a “non-idealistic” war.  On May 30 the Times, asserting that both parties in America were bidding for English support, summed up public opinion as follows: