where there were in fact no such ideals involved as had been earlier attributed to it.  Southern rights were now more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though greatly to be regretted, was now at hand, it was England’s business to keep strictly out of it and to maintain neutrality[152].  This generalization was no doubt satisfactory to the public, but in the Government and in Parliament men who were thinking seriously of specific difficulties realized that the two main problems immediately confronting a British neutral policy were privateering and blockade.  The South had declared its intention to use privateers.  The North had declared its intention, first to hang those who engaged in privateering, and second to establish a blockade.  Neither declaration had as yet been put into effect.

The first action of the British Government was directed toward privateering.  On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern plan to issue letters of marque and reprisal and directing that reinforcements be sent to the British fleet in American waters.  This was prompt action on unofficial information, for Davis’ proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons’ despatch containing copies of it, sent on April 22, was not received by Russell until May 10[153].  Ordinary news from the United States required ten days to get into print in London[154], but official messages might be sent more rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamer to Liverpool and by telegraph again to London.  In case the telegram to Halifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time was occasionally reduced to seven days, but never less.  At the best the exact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincoln proclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been received only a few days before the order was issued to reinforce the British fleet.

[Illustration:  Photo:  F. Hollyer.  SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G. (From Lady Gregory’s “Sir William Gregory, K.C.M.G.:  An Autobiography,” by kind permission)]

The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked “if Privateers sailing under the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with as Pirates,” thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at the Davis and Lincoln proclamations.  Russell stated in reply that a British fleet had been sent to protect British interests and took occasion to indicate British policy by adding, “we have not been involved in any way in that contest by any act or giving any advice in the matter, and, for God’s sake, let us if possible keep out of it[155].”  May 6, Gregory, a friend of the South, who had already given notice of a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy as an independent State, asked whether the United States had been informed that a blockade of Southern ports would not be recognized unless effective, and whether there would be acquiescence in the belligerent