In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and announced.  The letter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to be a “regular war” was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction giving Lyons advance notice of the determination reached by the Cabinet to recognize the belligerent rights of the South.  Russell indulged in many expressions of regret and sympathy, but Lyons was not to conceal that this British action represented the Government’s view of the actualities of the American situation.  Yet while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion he was not instructed to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition of Southern belligerency[145].  Here was a correct understanding of the difficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a permitted avoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground[146].  Russell was not then aware of the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a theory, not yet clearly formulated for foreign governments, that the Civil War was a rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of governments, but he does appear to have understood the delicacy of formal notification to the constituted government at Washington[147].  Moreover his instructions were in line with the British policy of refusing, at present, a recognition of Southern sovereignty.

On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was sent to Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to request France to join, promptly, in recognizing Southern belligerent rights.  Cowley was also instructed that the blockade and privateering required precautions by European governments, and it was suggested that France and England unite in requesting both belligerents to accede to the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris[148].  These articles refer to the exemption from capture, except contraband, of enemy’s goods under a neutral flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy’s flag[149].  This day, also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to recognize the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the measure as a necessary and inevitable one.  May 7, Cowley notified Russell that Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement with England’s policy[150], and on May 9, in a more extended communication, Cowley sent word of Thouvenel’s suggestion that both powers issue a declaration that they “intended to abstain from all interference,” and that M. de Flahault, French Ambassador at London, had been given instructions to act in close harmony with Russell[151].

The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days from May 1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and press somewhat by surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper comment even after Russell’s parliamentary announcement of policy on the last-named date.  But on May 9 the Times set the fashion of general approval in an editorial stating that Great Britain was now coming to see the American conflict in a new light—­as a conflict