ports and their discontinuance as ports of entry—­topics on which I had heard nothing.  But as I informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention to be on his way hither, in the steamship ‘Niagara,’ which left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor.  The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his lordship’s suggestion.”

May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two Southern commissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost.  As reported by them[140], Russell listened with attention to their representation, but made no informing comment.  They argued the constitutional right of secession, depicted the firm determination of the South, were confident of early acquiescence by the North, and especially laid stress on the Southern desire for free trade.  Russell’s own report to Lyons on this interview and on one held six days later, May 9, is in substantial agreement, but much more is made by him than by the Commissioners of a question put by Russell as to a Southern plan of reviving the African slave-trade[141].  Yancey and Rost denied this and asserted “that they had prohibited the slave-trade, and did not mean to revive it.”  Their report to Richmond does not depict this matter as of special significance in the interview; Russell’s report to Lyons lays stress upon it.  The general result of the interview was that Russell listened, but refused, as to Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition.  But the Southern Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and were content to wait on British action[142].

On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the Attorney-General a memorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing the belligerency of the South and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque and reprisal.  The memorandum notes that Southern privateering would be dangerous to British commerce with the North, but sees no help for it.  “The best solution,” wrote the Attorney-General, “would be for the European nations to determine that the war between the two Confederacies shall be carried on on the principles of ‘Justum Bellum,’ and shall be conducted according to the rules of the Treaty of Paris.  Recognize the Southern States as a Belligerent on this condition only[143].”  The next day, referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the law officers “are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in America as regular war[144],” but he does not comment on the legal advice to press the South to abandon privateering before recognizing her belligerent rights, for this is the only meaning that can be attached to the last sentence quoted from the Attorney-General’s memorandum.  This advice, however, in view of the opinion that there was “no help for it,” was presumably but a suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvre with little confidence that it would succeed.  The “best solution” was not the probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readily yield its only naval weapon.