that civil war seemed certain was known on April 29.  On April 17, Davis, since the South lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issue letters of marque and reprisal.  On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed a Northern intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under such letters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to be instituted later.  Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British officials and public after the long delay and uncertainty of months, events in America had precipitated a state of war, though in fact there were still to elapse other months in which both North and South laboured to transform a peaceful society into one capable of waging effective battle.

The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to alter, almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British policy, though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting the turn of events, had given careful consideration to the steps required of it in just such a situation as had now arisen.  Certainly both Lyons and Russell had been deeply anxious for some time, and had visualized a proper British policy.  The movement in Great Britain now became rapid.  On April 29, Malmesbury, in the Lords, spoke of the news of civil war which had arrived “this morning,” and asked if the Government had tried to prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with other powers to check it.  Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the United States as an independent State would have resented any suggestions from Great Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be extremely careful about offering advice unless “asked for by the contending parties themselves.”  Both speakers commented on the “ties of blood” rendering Britain especially anxious in this American quarrel, and regretted the conflict[136].  Malmesbury’s query as to the approach to another government, meaning France, was evaded.  That some such approach, in accordance with the earlier advice of Lyons[137], had already been made, is evident from the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallas learned from Russell of the plan of joint action with France, though what that action would be was not made clear[138].  As Dallas’ report was soon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be considered, the paragraph referring to this matter is important: 

“The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President induced him to request me to call at his private residence yesterday.  I did so.  He told me that the three representatives of the Southern confederacy were here[139]; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, unofficially; that there existed an understanding between this government and that of France which would lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be; and he then referred to the rumour of a meditated blockade of Southern