than in political position.  Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp the importance to the South of a well-considered and energetic foreign policy.  At first, indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attention to the exclusion of other matters.  Until war cemented Southern patriotism, Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessary in denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, to appoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on both slavery and secession[130].  “The single exception to this general policy[131]” was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost and Mann, all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists.  Of these Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic experience.  Yancey’s choice was particularly inappropriate, for he at least was known abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern orator, demanding for ten years past, that Southern action in defence of states rights and Southern “interests,” which now, at last, the South was attempting[132].

Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached London on April 29[133].  Meanwhile in this same month of April, conditions in America, so long confused and uncertain, were being rapidly clarified.  The South, earlier than the North, had come to a determined policy, for while during January and February, at the Montgomery convention, there had been uncertainty as to actively applying the doctrinaire right of secession, by March the party of action had triumphed, and though there was still talk of conferences with the North, and commissioners actually appointed, no real expectation existed of a favourable result.  In the North, the determination of policy was more slowly developed.  Lincoln was not inaugurated until March 4, and no positive pronouncement was earlier possible.  Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed.  European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing to let the South go in peace.  The Mayor of New York City was discussing the advisability of a separate secession by that financial centre from Nation and State alike—­and of setting up as a “free town.”  Seward, just appointed Secretary of State, was repudiating in both official and private talk any intention to coerce the South by force of arms[134].  It is no wonder that British statesmen were largely at sea over the American situation.

But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort Sumter in Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal fortress under the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy.  That event drove away as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and removed the last vestiges of Southern doubt.  A great wave of militant patriotism swept over both sections[135].  Hurriedly both North and South prepared for war, issuing calls for volunteers and organizing in all accustomed warlike preparations.  The news of Sumter reached London on April 27, and