Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the main voice of the Government; rather, save in times of extreme crisis, governmental foreign policy was Russell’s policy.  This was even more true as regards American than European affairs, for the former were little understood, and dependence was necessarily placed upon the man whose business it was to be familiar with them.  Indeed there was little actual parliamentary or governmental interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the American question, attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italian expansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionian islands, and to the developing Danish troubles in Schleswig-Holstein.  Neither did the opposition party venture to express a policy as regards America.  Lord Derby, able but indolent, occasionally indulged in caustic criticism, but made no attempt to push his attack home.  Malmesbury, his former Foreign Secretary, was active and alert in French affairs, but gave no thought to relations across the Atlantic[128].  Disraeli, Tory leader in the Commons, skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on the Government’s policy, but never on the American question, though frequently urged to do so by the friends of the South.  In short for the first year of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain toward America was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friend or foe.

This being the case, what did Russell know about the American crisis?  Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived from the reports of British officials in the United States, and from the pages of the public press.  The salient facts known to Russell were few.  Lincoln’s Cabinet had been named.  Lincoln himself was absolutely an unknown quantity, but it was unbelievable that a man of his origins and history could be more than a mere figurehead—­an opinion then held as widely in America as in England.  But someone must determine American policy, and by universal consent, this would be Seward.

The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in England than any other American statesman, with the possible exception of Charles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had established a circle of British friendships.  Both men were accepted as champions of anti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations and his so-called “martyrdom” under the physical violence of the South Carolinan, Brooks; and Seward for his clever political anti-Southern leadership in the United States Senate.  But Seward’s reputation in this respect was offset by the belief that he was anti-British in his personal sentiments, or at least that he was very ready to arouse for political ends the customary anti-British sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of New York.  In 1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of the Prince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke of Newcastle that in case he became Secretary