In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had outrun diplomatic action by America.  Scattered Southern forces still in the field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while at Washington all was temporarily in confusion upon the death of Lincoln and the illness of Seward.  Bruce’s advice had been wise and the prompt action of Russell fortunate.  Seward at once accepted Russell’s notification of June 2 as ending British neutrality.  While again insisting upon the essential injustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South, and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he yet admitted that normal relations were again established and acknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right of search[1317].  July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament, reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that the United States could now enter again upon normal relations with Great Britain[1318].  Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had not expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England’s neutrality position, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstood and were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by the expression of a hope for the “establishment of a lasting and intimate friendship between the two nations[1319].”

* * * * *

Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January, 1860, was about to experience one of those “strokes of fortune” which occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching dissolution of the American Union.  She alone, of all the nations of the world, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hitherto blocked by the might of the United States.  Broken into two or more hostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become her plaything.  “The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which it has difficulty in disguising.”  Great Britain would soon, in return for cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed support.  For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the slaves.  The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for all nations save England, since hitherto the “struggle” between England and the United States “has been the best guarantee against the ambitious projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320].”

This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeated frequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first two years of the war.  Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion.  The French Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also—­and the French Emperor puzzled himself in vain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her own interests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous joint action in support of the South[1321].