feelings towards both Sections of this Country, and secondly with the recognized principles of International Law.  As regards the latter point in particular, it certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the only way, would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy[98].”

This was plain speaking, and Lyons’ threat of recognizing the South did not at the moment stir Seward to any retort.  But five days later, on March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number of the foreign Ministers, and there Seward’s violent talk about seizing any and all ships that tried to trade with the South, even if there was no blockade, made Lyons very anxious.  As a host he diverted the conversation lest it become too acrimonious, but he himself told Seward

“... that it was really a matter so very serious that I was unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in the dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of submitting to the interruption of their commerce[99].”

Lyons’ advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the Southern Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they be treated well.  This, he thought, might open Seward’s eyes to his folly.  Still Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so vigorous as his language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he wrote that “prudent counsels” were in the ascendant, that there would be no interference with trade “at present,” and that a quieter tone was everywhere perceptible in Washington[100].

From the point of view of the British Minister at Washington, the danger spot in relations between the United States and Great Britain lay in this matter of interference with trade to Southern ports.  Naturally, and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that trade.  At first, indeed, he seems to have thought that even though a civil war really ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted.  Certainly he bore hard and constantly on this one point, seeking to influence not only officials at Washington but the public press.  Thus, in a letter to Bunch dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he knew that W.H.  Russell, the Times correspondent, would shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed Bunch to remember that in talking to Russell he must especially impress him with the idea that any interruption of trade might and probably would result in a British recognition of the South.  Lyons wrote, “... the only chance, if chance there still be of preventing an interruption of the English commerce with the S. is the fear entertained here, that it would lead to our recognizing the S.C.[101]” In these words is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, the fact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade rather than that he was convinced such interruption ought to result in a British recognition of the South.  Indeed, as will be seen, when the blockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause for recognition and was most tolerant of its early ineffectiveness.