been instructed to take up with Russell, but with discretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them as inopportune.  Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward’s complaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them “at this moment would be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and disarming our own friends[1277].”  The day before this was written home Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to the agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the United States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the Great Lakes[1278].

Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement over a prospective war with America, even though no such intention was seriously entertained by the North.  The British Government did not share this fear, but Delane, of the Times, kept it alive in the public mind, and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger.  “I do not know what grounds Delane has for it,” wrote W.H.  Russell to his American friend Bigelow, “but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is about to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcely less horrible[1279].”  Governmental circles, however, belittled the agitation.  Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, was assured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreign war were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at the Hampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North as but part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had been flatly refused[1280].  In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March 13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures in Canada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with America.  A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the general tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peaceful relations.  Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and left criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparing members of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in the pacific policy of Lincoln.  As one known to be in close touch with America his words carried weight[1281].  Palmerston gave assurances that the present relations between the two Governments were perfectly friendly and satisfactory.  The effect of the debate, reported Adams, was to quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake to and somewhat alarmed by, America’s “prodigious development of physical power during the war.”  To quiet this, Adams recommended “prudence and moderation in tone[1283].”

Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possible effect of this event on foreign relations had been for some time anticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284].  The news of Lee’s surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the Times and other papers had been preparing the public for it[1285].  Newspaper comment on the event followed closely that of the Times, rendering honour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing finis to the war: