they were not so favourable.  Mann, wrote Bunch, was the son of a “bankrupt grocer.”  His personal character was “not good,” yet he alone of the three Commissioners appointed had had diplomatic experience.  Yancey, it was stated, was an able lawyer, a stirring orator, and a recognized leader of the secession movement, but he was also extremely pro-slavery in his views, had expressed himself in favour of a renewal of the slave trade, and throughout his career had been a “manifest destiny” man.  Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge.  In conclusion Bunch described the extreme confidence expressed in the South in “King Cotton,” and in rather bitter criticism stated that the Southern Commissioners thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now be compelled to bend the knee and recognize the South in order to get cotton[95].

The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an astonishingly pro-Northern view of the whole situation.  Archibald, consul at New York, wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter, an exceedingly strong statement of his faith in the power of the North and its fixed and unalterable determination to force the South back into the Union, his confidence in Northern success, and his belief in the justice of the Northern cause.  He ventured to suggest the proper policy for England to pursue, viz., to offer immediately her services in mediation but wholly and clearly on the side of the North.  He stated that if England did not feel free to offer mediation, she should at least show “such a consistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid” for the North as would help in shortening the war[96].  The British Consul at Boston wrote to Russell in much the same vein.  So far, indeed, did these men go in expressing their sympathy with the North, that Lyons, on April 27, commented to Russell that these consuls had “taken the Northern War Fever,” and that he had mildly reproved Archibald[97].

With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the installation of Seward as Secretary of State, it was possible for Lyons to become more active in his efforts to prevent a disruption of British Trade.  On March 20 he told Seward in a confidential conversation: 

“...  If the United States determined to stop by force so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might happen.

“...  It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to England to procure cheap cotton.  If a considerable rise were to take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an immense pressure would be put upon Her Majesty’s Government to use all the means in their power to open those ports.  If Her Majesty’s Government felt it to be their duty to do so, they would naturally endeavour to effect their object in a manner as consistent as possible, first with their friendly