by past misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end, and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady continuance in its suicidal policy.  But we are persuaded that the people of this country view the prospect of another four years of war in America with very different feelings.  They are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the path that leadeth to destruction[1230].

Sherman’s capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln would again be chosen President, but the Times was more slow to acknowledge its military importance, first hinting and then positively asserting that Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficulty in escaping[1231].  The Gazette called this “blind partisanship[1232],” but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and results of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that election day would see the use of “force, fraud and every mechanism known to the most unscrupulous political agitation.”  “We confess,” it continued, “we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as it dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation for justice and honour throughout the world[1233].”  Again official England was striking a note far different from that of the press[1234].  Adams paid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chief informed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active in determining, governmental policy.  The autumn “season for speeches” by Members of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was inexpedient to meddle in American affairs.  As the Presidential election in America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events.  Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends in America to vote for Lincoln[1235].  Writing from Washington, Lyons, as always anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote to Russell, “We must be prepared for demonstrations of a ’spirited foreign policy’ by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneering purposes[1236].”  Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for four days later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to “postpone as much as possible all business with him until after the election[1237].”  By November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and in replying, “You will come away at once,” Russell added that he was entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious difficulties with Great Britain.