For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to report, but up to the end of January he had not written in any great detail with regard to the new administration and its make-up, though on January 7, he had informed Russell that Seward would be the Secretary of State and had expressed the fear that with regard to Great Britain he would be “a dangerous Foreign Minister[85].”  Lincoln was still in Illinois and the constituency of the Cabinet was yet uncertain, but Seward’s voice was sure to be a powerful one.  Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to talk with him.  On February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell, Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was but superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon prevail[86].  In a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons asserted that Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary of State.  He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in order to resist such interference[87].  Again, on February 12, while himself expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties in America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would solve these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign governments refused to acknowledge a United States declaration without formal blockade closing the Southern ports[88].  Writing privately, Lyons exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward’s attitude and suggested that the best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for if these two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade, Seward would hardly dare to carry out his threat[89].

Lyons’ letter of February 4 called out from Russell an instruction in which it was repeated that advice to either party should be withheld and a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded by an assertion that if the United States attempted a jingo policy toward England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of strength but that “blustering demonstrations” must not be carried too far[90].  Even as early as December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the possibility of what he considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in America.  Now, however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons that this might be more than mere “bunkum,” Russell began to instruct Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American antagonism.  Lyons’ earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have passed away for a time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone was waiting to see what Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that there was still hope of compromise, and that in his own view this was still possible.  In this letter the tone is more important than the matter, and so far as Lyons is concerned the tone is all distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a resumption of normal relations between the North and South.  He at least had no hope of disruption, and no happiness in it[91].