“I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, editor of the Herald, had written to Hotze about his connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the pas.  Disraeli’s accession, as you remember, was contingent upon our success in Virginia—­and agreeing entirely with Lindsay that the movement could not be in better hands and as there were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I thought the better policy would be for the present that he should be silent and to await events[1186].”

Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best advantage the South to be rid of Russell: 

“If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful, Lindsay’s motion must succeed.  Query, how would its being brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell’s action—­if he can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified assent[1187].”

But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a change of Government.  By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would “of course postpone Lindsay’s projected motion[1188].”  On June 25, the Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was renewed.  There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston’s bluster followed by a meek British inaction.  The debate came on a vote of censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental policy as one of “meddle and muddle.”  The censure was carried in the Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial majority of eighteen.  It was the sharpest political crisis of Palmerston’s Ministry during the Civil War.  Every supporting vote was needed[1189].

Not only had Lindsay’s motion been postponed but the interview with Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in view of the parliamentary crisis.  When finally held on July 14, it resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln’s defeat in the coming Presidential election was proof of this.  Palmerston appears to have said little.

“At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the obligation would be increased if I could take with me any expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense that the war should come to an end.