Great Britain and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 825 pages of information about Great Britain and the American Civil War.

Great Britain and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 825 pages of information about Great Britain and the American Civil War.
“Although this quite expresses the object of our Society, still I do not think the ‘Independence Association’ ought to have ‘ratted’ from its principles.  It ought not to have consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to bring before Parliament—­that of the Independence of the Confederacy—­and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be allowed.  You know the resolution and therefore I need only quote the obnoxious words ’That Her Majesty’s Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.’

     “This is just leaving the Government where they have been all
     along.  They have always professed to take ’the earliest
     opportunity’ but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!”

Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the leaders of Southern friends.  Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it.  Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it should depict the “complete defeat and dispersion” of Northern forces[1184].  The day following the Times reported Grant to be meeting fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman’s easy advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the West[1185].  But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field.  Mason understood this perfectly.  He had yielded to Lindsay’s insistence and had come to London.  There he listened to Lindsay’s account of the interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell: 

“Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well disposed to go into conversation.  Lord Russell agreed that the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and that neither could union be restored nor the South brought under the yoke....  In regard to Lindsay’s motion Lord Russell said, that he could not accept it, but if brought up for discussion his side would speak favourably of it.  That is to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it.”

This referred to Lindsay’s original motion of using the “earliest opportunity of mediation,” and the pleasant reception given by Russell scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South.  It must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming contest with the Tories.  The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary management, were angling for every doubtful vote.  Discussing with Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him unexpectedly in agreement: 

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Great Britain and the American Civil War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.