On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of possible war which would at once call for a determination of British policy.  “Above all things,” he wrote, “endeavour to prevent a blockade of the Southern coast.  It would produce misery, discord, and enmity incalculable[82].”  Within a week Forster, a thorough friend of the North throughout the whole war, was interrogating the Ministry in the House of Commons in regard to the situation at Charleston, and expressing the hope that England would not in any way attempt to interfere[83].  This was the first reference in Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after the long vacation, to the American conflict, but British commercial interests were being forced to a keener attention, and already men in many circles were asking themselves what should be the proper governmental attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy could justly claim European recognition; how far and how fast European governments ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to be the proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, a declaration of neutrality ought to be issued.

With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became important for British statesmen to know something about the leaders in this new Southern movement, the attitude of the people in general, and the purposes of the new Government.  Here, unfortunately, Lord Lyons could be no guide.  The consuls in the South, however, were in a position to give their impressions.  On February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell, describing the election of Davis and Stephens[84], to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the Confederacy, and giving a personal characterization of many members of the Government.  He was rather caustic.  Davis, he said, was the only able man, and he, unfortunately, was a confirmed “manifest destiny” leader, so much so in fact that Bunch prophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had acquiesced in a Southern State and the fear of the North had passed.  Bunch had no faith in any future greatness of the South, asserting that it would be a State despised among nations for its maintenance of slavery, and that it could not hope for any encouragement or sympathy from the humane nations of Europe; in fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning to the South.  Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questioned that the South had already actually established its independence.  This he seems to take for granted.  Thus again, and from another quarter, there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to the Civil War—­the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity long preached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and her certainty that a new State was being born.